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2.1.  Introduction:  The British School Education System. 
One of the most robust and consistent findings in educational research is that a child’s 
educational attainment is greatly affected by its family background.  A crucial issue for policy 
is whether schools have any effect on children’s attainment or whether it is all determined by 
family background and personality traits.  If schools are differentially effective then the 
school attended matters for children’s educational attainment and can reinforce or counter 
family influences. Another motivation for research on school effectiveness is to discover the 
factors associated with more effective schools so as to spread these more widely.  
The British state schooling system is centralised, with all pupils following a National 
Curriculum and sitting nationally set public examinations at age 7, 11, 14, 16, 17 and 18
1.  In 
this system all teachers are paid using a national pay scale.  Each school’s budget is largely 
dependent on the number of pupils it has and this grant comes from the central government. 
However, it is administered by the Local Education Authorities (LEA), which may set their 
own educational priorities (financed by local taxation), thus variations in school funding 
between LEAs is possible (Figure 1).  Furthermore, compensatory educational funding is 
given to geographical areas with a higher deprivation scores
2. 
Various types of school co-exist in the UK. The distinction between the public and the 
private sector is clear.  The private system of independent schools
3 is relatively autonomous 
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1 These examinations are respectively Key Stage I, II, III, GCSE, AS and A2 examinations. The first three of 
these are taken in the core skills of English, Maths and Science.  GCSE is usually taken in up to 10 subjects, AS 
level in 3-5 subjects and A2 in 2-3 subjects.  See Mackinnon and Statham (1999) for full details. 
2 See Glennerster (2003b) for details of how schools are funded in the UK. 
3 Some of these elite independent schools are confusingly called ‘public schools’. but broadly follows the National Curriculum. Such schools select, stream
4 and teach by ability 
and are free to charge fees.  Within the state sector, whilst 85% of schools are comprehensive, 
some local education authorities allow tracking of the pupils
5. This is a remnant of the 
previous stratified system, where children used to be tested at age 11 (the 11-plus exam). 
Successful pupils would then carry on the academic track in grammar school typically up to 
the age of 18, while the others would go to a “secondary modern” school to follow a more 
vocational curriculum until they reached 16. Very few children were able to switch route after 
the age of 11. This stratification of education was mostly dismantled in the 1970s and 
replaced by a system where most children attend the same “comprehensive school” 
independently of academic aptitude
6. 
 












The last three decades have been an era of unprecedented changes in the UK education 
system. The most important reforms concern: the raising of the school leaving age from 15 to 
16 (in 1972), the introduction of comprehensive schools (1976 Education Act); the complete 
overhaul of the age 16 school examination system with the abolition of CSEs and GCE 
O’levels and the introduction of GCSEs in 1986 (and first examined in 1988); the introduction 
of governing bodies for schools with parental representation (1980); the compulsorily 
publication of school examination results. The reforms have changed the way schools 
function and, children are taught and examined. 
                                                 
4 The system of using differential teaching by ability – often in separate classes –, is usually called ‘streaming in 
the UK but is known as ‘tracking’ in the USA.  We use these terms interchangeably. 
5 The distribution of pupils in 1971 was 39% secondary, 36% comprehensive, 18% grammar, technical 7%. By 
1991, the percentages were respectively 10, 85, 5, 0 (MacKinnon and Statham, 1999). 
6 The 1976 Act required LEAs to introduce comprehensive schools in place of schools split by the 11 plus 
examination.  This act was repealed in 1979 and to this day this has left us with some LEAs (a minority) in 
which selective state grammar schools still exist.  
  2Perhaps the most radical changes in the education system came with the 1988 Education 
Reform Act, which introduced the National Curriculum. The National Curriculum is highly 
prescriptive in the form and content of subjects to be taught in schools; required Local 
Education Authorities (LEAs) to delegate financial management and the appointment of staff 
to the governing bodies of schools and allowed schools to opt out of LEA control altogether.  
Under these reforms schools got a better control of their budget and receive their funding 
directly from the central government. League tables (of school examination results) were 
introduced in order to inform parents who were granted greater flexibility in the choice of 
schools for their child, and as a way to increase competition between schools. Finally, to 
insure that competition would not lead to a reduction of quality, the Education Act of 1992 
introduced the Office for Standards in Education.  This administrative body had the 
responsibility of inspecting every school at least once every four years.  During the 
Conservative government administrations (1979-1997) these reforms were introduced to 
create a quasi market in the provision of publicly funded education by granting more choice 
for pupils and parents and more accountability in the governing of the education process (see 
Glennerster (1991) for a review).   
The pace of change and policy ‘initiatives’ in the education field under the Blair 
government has been relentless.  Some of the more important recent changes in the education 
policy arena have introduced the notion of ‘Beacon schools’ which are models of good 
practice and encouraged the exchange of best practice between bad and good schools; 
launched the Excellence in Cities (EiC) program which aims to help inner city schools with 
their various disadvantages; facilitated the creation of specialist schools with particular 
subject strengths. 
 
2.2  The Current Education Policy Environment. 
In this section we review the educational policy environment and briefly discuss the 
main questions relating to the provision and utilisation of resources in schools. The setting for 
this discussion is the market led reforms which have characterised the UK education system 
in the last 15 years.   So often policy decisions relating to education have been made on 
grounds of political ideology rather than hard evidence relating to what is most effective
7.  
The move towards economic liberalism and a faith in the market mechanisms has guided 
much of recent educational reform in the UK.  Now the predominant themes are 
                                                 
7 The most influential tracts on education reform have been written by policy advisors with a specific ideological 
view of the world. See Barber (1996), Tooley (2000) and Woodhead (2002)  
  3accountability, autonomy and diversity.  The 2001 government White Paper on schools 
emphasized the need for autonomy and diversity for schools – so that they ‘can take full 
responsibility for their mission’ and ‘cater significantly better for diverse requirements’
8.  The 
system is to be ‘underpinned by the mechanisms of accountability, inspection and 
intervention’
9. 
There are many key questions for education policy, which relate to schools.  We introduce 
some of the most important in this section. 
1.  What is the role of the market as a resource allocation device in education? What has 
happened as a result of the market reforms in the provision of education in the UK? 
How well do quasi markets work within the state system of education? Does the state 
provide enough choice in its provision of public education and what is the scope for 
private provision? How well does market led reform provide appropriate incentives to 
individual agents in the education system? With the year on year rises in GCSE and A 
level pass rates there is an annual debate about whether standards in the public 
examinations have been falling and what are the consequences of this falling 
standards?  Since it is clear that the government has decreed that standards must rise 
and that examinations scores are the yardsticks for this performance then it is no 
surprise that pass rates have risen – as these are largely under the control of the 
government. This makes it extremely difficult to assess whether there are genuinely 
more young people who are qualified or whether qualification inflation is taking place. 
These questions are addressed in section 2.3 of this chapter.  
2.  Recently boys have been performing worse in school than girls.  This is a difficult 
issue to which we return in section 2.4 of this chapter.  
3.  Should the school curriculum be broader from age 16-18?  There is a substantial body 
of opinion that the A level curriculum, taking only 3 subjects, is far too narrow.  We 
will examine this debate in section 2.5. 
4.  Is there a reliable way to measure school quality and what is its effect on pupil 
outcomes?  How do we measure teacher and school effectiveness and what is the 
evidence on the extent to which they matter?  These issues are discussed in sections 
2.6 and 2.7 of this chapter. 
                                                 
8 See p6 of DfES(2001). 
9 See p6 of DfES(2001). 
 
  45. What are the central economic resource problems of public sector provision of 
education?  Many of them revolve around the fact that education has multiple goals 
and multiple principals.  We discuss this issue in some detail in section 2.8. 
6.  How do we make public sector schools accountable? How well has the publication of 
school league tables worked as an information device to facilitate the working of the 
quasi market in school places?   Can schools be made to be responsive to parental 
views about standards and the shape of the curriculum? Can parents exercise effective 
choice for the education of their children within a state system of education – or are 
most of them simply constrained to what is available locally?  Is the prospect for real 
parental choice different in different geographical areas?  How do we resolve the 
problems of Inner London school provision where most parents wish to send their 
children to a select few schools, which are heavily over-subscribed? Does the 
exercising of choice in education inevitably lead to streaming and differential 
treatment of ability groups and could there be resulting important consequences for 
inequality?  
7.  Perhaps the most central question in the economics of education is whether there is a 
link between educational resources (and the quality of provision) and subsequent 
outcomes.  Exactly what schooling resource policy promotes better pupil outcomes?  
Is it the case that smaller class size and more resources will necessarily produce higher 
attainment in pupils?  Do pupils who receive a better school education eventually earn 
more in the labour market?  These are the major policy questions for this chapter and 
we devote section 2.10 to 2.14 to different aspects of this debate. 
8.  One of the main characteristics of schools is whether they practise some form of 
selection. Private schools but also publicly funded grammar schools practice selection 
on financial and for the latter ability criteria. Accounting for the difference in pupils’ 
intake do selective schools achieve better results? Evidence, reviewed in section 2.15 
would also be informative on the effectiveness of streaming pupils in the classroom. 
 
This array of issues together forms the heart of the educational provision debate in the UK 
(and many other countries too). Many of them are debated in detail in Adnett and Davies 
(2002).  These authors focus on three key questions: Should resources be allocated away from 
unsuccessful schools? Does the increased use of incentives have to jeopardise co-operation?  
Is increased polarisation of educational standards between good schools and bad schools 
inevitable?  The first of these questions is perhaps the most important.  School league tables 
  5exercise a punitive resource penalty on schools that perform badly via their resulting lower 
enrolments.  However other policies designed to reward diversity and compensate inner city 
schools and those groups who are currently victims of ‘social exclusion’ like EiC and the 
‘Social Inclusion’ initiative will provide more resources for many schools with lower 
performance.  Hence there are clearly contradictory elements in present policies. 
There are various other educational policy issues and debates which we will not examine 
– partly because of the paucity of evidence relating to them.  Three of the most immediate and 
recurrent, which capture considerable media attention are: 
1.  What is the rationale for, and what have been the consequences of, greater devolution 
of management control to schools? What are the implications of this changing 
management for school governance? 
2.  What is causing the rising truancy epidemic, what are its long-term consequences and 
what can be done to alleviate the problem? The main policy response from 
government on this issue is to blame parents and seeks to make them more responsible 
for their child’s attendance at school – if necessary through fining parents whose 
children persistently absent themselves from school.  It is unclear what the effects of 
this policy are.  
3.  Why is it the case that around 50% of school children leave school without 5 GCSE 
A-C passes - and even more shocking – why do around 25% of school children leave 
school with next to no qualifications? Government response to this issue has been to 
try to encourage a wider range of lower level and vocational qualifications.  However 
employers and lower ability school leavers have been slow to embrace them. 
 
2.3  Incentives and Quasi Markets in UK Schools. 
 
There has been a major shift in the way in which public sector education has been 
provided in the UK over the last 20 years. The educational system has changed to one 
dominated by incentive structures and quasi markets.  These changes have produced a 
revolution in state educational provision.  The results and consequences so far have been 
mixed
10.  Indeed some of these quasi market reforms have had some unintended 
consequences. 
The general aim of the 1988 Education Reform Act was to introduce a more 
competitive quasi-market approach to the allocation of resources in the education system.  It 
                                                 
10 See Adnett and Davies (2002) for a description of the ‘market-led’ reforms in the UK. 
  6introduced financial delegation to schools and this involved the introduction of ‘formula 
funding’ in which school income is based directly on pupil numbers. The Act insisted on the 
publication of school league tables and introduced the principle that parents had the right to 
send their children to any school they wished. The idea was that popular schools were allowed 
to expand without limit, and conversely unpopular schools, mostly in inner cities, would 
contract or even close. The principal of parental choice and devolved school funding linked 
directly to pupil numbers establishes the conditions under which – theoretically – a quasi 
market can operate.  This approach was designed to provide teachers and schools with 
appropriate incentives for efficiency and effectiveness.  Although living within its school 
budget does not provide the same incentives for employees as knowing that their efforts 
contribute to the profit ‘bottom line’ of a firm and their earnings.  
One clear feature of the state education system in the UK is that there is a lack of 
competition. State schools in the UK, in many areas, operate essentially as a monopoly 
provider.  Only around 7% of school children in the UK attend independent schools.  Due to 
the scale of their fees, for most parents, these independent schools do not present a realistic 
alternative to state schools.  It was this lack of competition that was part of the rationale for 
the 1988 Education Act. The central idea behind the creation of a quasi-market in state 
education is the theory that competition would provide the appropriate incentives to schools 
to become more efficient, which may in turn provide incentives for teachers to improve their 
performance.  However, this naïve faith in the power of market forces must be tempered by 
the reality that multiple tasks and multiple agents weaken the power of such incentive 
structures.  
Empirical evidence from the USA (Chubb and Moe (1990)) supports the view that 
decentralized schooling systems produce better results, measured in terms of educational 
outcomes.  The 1988 Act also devolved the administrative and financial control of schools to 
their head teacher and governing body in which parents gained representation. Barlett (1993) 
reports that the effect of the reform has been a large shift in the distribution of resources 
between schools.  Schools in the poorest inner-city areas have received reduced funding 
whilst funding has increased to schools in the more prosperous areas of the county.  Likewise 
the appointment of proactive parent governors in middle class areas is straightforward but 
finding any parents willing to do the job in deprived areas is difficult. Overall the effect of the 
quasi-market reforms on educational outcomes and efficiency in the UK is hard to judge; not 
least because there are several initiatives acting on the market at the same time.  Nevertheless 
there are some micro-econometric studies, which suggest that efficiency improvements can be 
  7directly attributed to the quasi-market (Bradley et al 2001).  Specifically the authors find that 
the schools with the best examination performance grow most quickly and that increased 
competition between schools has led to improved exam performance. However, similarly to 
the US experience (Hoxby, 1997) increased efficiency was associated with a greater 
segregation between schools, as measured by the proportion of children eligible for free 
school meals (Bradley and Taylor, 2002). In reality access to oversubscribed schools remains 
rationed with some selectivity and ‘cream skimming’ operating.  This has been reflected by 
rising house prices in localities with the best performing schools (Gibbons and Machin 
(2003)
11. 
Since 1995 the government has published school league tables of the results of all schools 
in the UK based on national examinations for pupils aged 7, 11, 14, 16, and 18. Some 
commentators, e.g. Glennerster (2002) have suggested that these results show how 
educational standards have improved in the UK over the last 6 years.  Table 1 shows a 
remarkable rise in the performance of 14 year olds in the UK on Reading, Maths and Science. 
The proportion reaching the expected standard in Reading has risen from 49% in 1995 to 81% 
in 2001. In Maths the proportion has risen from 45% to 70% and Science from 70% to 87% 
over the same period. The questions one must ask about such statistics are:   
a) to what extent are these tests based on absolute standards, which have not been 
manipulated by a government who have declared, as if by decree, that educational 
standards will rise over the next 5 years? Alternatively, have the exams become easier or 
have the pupils improved their performance over time because of the predictable nature of 
the exams and rote learning? 
b)   to what extent has there been misallocation of resources towards median and marginal 
pupils at the threshold of achievement levels in order to maximise the number of pupils 
passing thresholds? 
c)  if the improvement has been real – is it really a treatment effect, which results directly 
from the operation of the quasi-market rather than a redirection of effort on literacy and 
numeracy in the curriculum? 
d)  Are the long-term consequences of increasing marginal standards on narrowly focussed 
tests in maths and English valuable for long-term educational objectives like citizenship 
and transferable skills? 
                                                 
11 Hedonic models estimating school quality are reviewed in section 2.14. 
  8e)  Is it possible to reconcile these data with results from Gundlach et al (2001) who suggest 
that the UK along with OECD countries has experienced a dramatic fall in school 
productivity over the last 25 years? 
 
  9Table 1:  UK National Achievement Tests at Level 3 aged 14, % Reaching Expected 
Levels. 
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Reading    49 57 67 71 78 83 81 
Maths  45 54 62 58 69 72 70 
Science  70 62 69 69 79 85 87 
Source: Glennerster (2001) Table 6. 
 
2.4.  Gender differences in educational attainment. 
Gender differences in educational achievement have grabbed the attention of 
commentators. In recent years, females have been outperforming males at all levels of 
education in the UK from age seven up to university. These trends in favour of females are 
rather recent, and can also be observed in most OECD countries (Ono, 2002). The increasing 
gap in attainment in favour of women reflects a reduction of the discrimination towards 
women but also gender differences in the attitude towards education and other non-cognitive 
skills, such as attention, organisation, and the aptitude to seek help (Jacob, 2002). 
We use ‘five or more grade A-C passes in GCSE or GCE/CSE at age 16’ to measure 
academic success at school. This measure was traditionally the requirement for university 
entrance, but, in more recent years, has become one of the prime indicators of educational 
success for 16 years old. In particular, it features in the school performance tables and is a key 
statistic in government publications. Figure 2 reproduces the official data showing the 
proportion achieving this level of success in England since 1974. The most noticeable feature 
is the clear break in the series after 1987. Before 1987, the series appears to be growing 
slowly. There was then a staggering growth in the proportion with good examination 
performances, with 33 per cent reported in 1989 and 45 per cent by the end of the period. 
Whilst, boys and girls improved, the pace of improvement has been dramatically faster for 
girls. Girls were on average about 1.3 percentage points better than boys in the six years 
before 1988. This difference had quickly increased to six points in 1989 and was about nine 
points or more in the mid-1990s. 
The dramatic change in performance would appear to be related to the replacement of O-
levels by GCSEs. GCSEs differed from the earlier GCE/CSEs because they included an 
element of class-work and allocated marks on an absolute scale (thus abandoning the idea that 
a certain percentage of the population should get a particular grade). The change in the style 
of the examination may have produced a large improvement in results and this effect would 
have almost certainly continued over time as the teaching process adjusted to new system. 
  10There were further innovations with the phased introduction of the National Curriculum and 
the publication of School Performance Tables. 
Although main changes appear clear from the official statistics, it is not possible to 
construct a fully consistent series from these data because there is a major discontinuity in the 
series between 1988 and 1989. Dolton et al (1999) have dealt with the problem of 
comparability by fitting separate trend models by gender to the data before and after 1988. 
They then predict the performance in 1988 using estimates from the O-level period and from 
the GCSE period. The difference shows the effect of the introduction of GCSEs. This exercise 
suggests that boys have improved by an extra 1.6 percentage points while girls have improved 
by an extra 6.4 percentage points. These results indicate that there was a substantial increase 
for both sexes in the proportion of successful candidates following the introduction of GCSEs 
but that the gain for girls have been four times as great as that for boys. 
 
















































































































5+ A-C Boys 5+ A-C Girls 5+ A-Cs Total
Source: Table 1 of Statistics of Education 1997. 
 
2.5.   The Issue of Curriculum Breadth. 
One of the continuing debates in the UK education system is how wide the curriculum 
should be in schools.  Specifically policy makers often cast admiring glances across to the 
French system of the Baccalaureate and claim that such a system would be better for the UK.  
It would involve most students studying up to 7 subjects from age 15-18 instead of our 3 or 4 
subjects.  We have had numerous reviews of our education system and each comes down in 
  11favour of changing to a system, which would have a wider curriculum at ages 16-18.  Two 
important facts are often ignored in this debate.  Firstly we have one of the widest curriculums 
anywhere in the world up to the age of 16 as most of our pupils study up to 10 subjects until 
this age.  Second, and perhaps more important there is little evidence that a wider curriculum 
is economically rational.  Dolton and Vignoles (2002b) find no return to studying a wider 
curriculum at 18 in subsequent earnings using a variety of different data sets.  What is clear 
from their other work (Dolton and Vignoles (2002a)) is that there is a clear return from further 
study of Mathematics after the age of 16 even conditioning for all other educational choices 
and achievements.  These findings should make us cautious in advocating reform of the 
curriculum to expand the number of subjects pupils study from age 16.  In contrast it suggests 
that there is a real need to improve mathematics skills – perhaps to the exclusion of other 
subjects. 
 
2.6. School effectiveness 
School effectiveness is a relative concept. An effective school is defined as one in which 
students progress further than might be expected from consideration of its intake (Mortimore, 
1991). In order to estimate the relative effectiveness of schools, researchers need data at pupil 
level on attainment at two points in time, as well as characteristics of the pupils and schools. 
These variables are sufficient for estimating a ‘basic’ school effectiveness model using 
multilevel modelling techniques that enables the variance in the attainment of pupils to be 
partitioned between pupils and school level.  Only schools that have statistically significant 
differences in the size of their effect on attainment can be designated as ‘effective’ or 
‘ineffective’ (Goldstein, 1997).  
The same approach can be used to study classroom effectiveness under the condition that 
data on at least two parallel classes in each school is available. A comprehensive model of 
school effectiveness (Teddlie and Reynolds, 1999) includes also process factors at school and 
classroom level.  School process factors relate to the school as an organisation and encompass 
its leadership, decision-making, staff-pupil and pupil-pupil relations, parental involvement, 
attitudes, expectations and norms. Process factors are also defined at class level and relate in 
particular to how the teaching is conducted and the interactions between teacher and pupils 
and pupils with each other. One of the aims of school effectiveness research is to identify 
school and class room processes that are not just related to school composition and pupil 
background but which have an independent effect on pupil attainment.  This is a difficult 
  12undertaking because of the difficulty of measuring processes and taking account of 
correlations between processes and between processes and school and pupil factors.  
Studies of this ‘comprehensive’ model of school effectiveness are relatively rare because 
they require a large-scale longitudinal research design with intensive fieldwork. These studies 
have collected data on processes from interviews, surveys and detailed observation, 
particularly of teaching.  Basic studies (those excluding process variables) are more 
numerous.   
The two most influential studies on school effectiveness concluded that school matters. 
Rutter et al. (1979) - 12 inner London secondary schools over four years and Mortimore et al. 
(1988) - 50 inner London primary schools over three years - established that ‘schools matter’.  
At primary level, after controlling for prior attainment and pupil factors, the school attended 
accounted for 9% of the variance in reading attainment after three years, and 11% of the 
variance in maths attainment. The maximum difference between the least and most effective 
schools was 25 points out of 100 in reading and 12 out of 50 in maths (Inner London 
Education Authority Research and Statistics Branch, 1986).  A child from a manual working 
class family in the most effective school did as well as a middle class child in the least 
effective school. In secondary education, school accounted for 10% of the variance in 
attainment and pupil factors for 33%. The school effects identified as affecting effectiveness 
were similar to the list produced in the literature review by Sammons et al. (1995): head 
teacher’s leadership, teachers’ shared vision and goals; a learning environment, focus on 
teaching and learning, purposeful teaching, high expectations, positive reinforcement, 
monitoring progress, pupils’ rights and responsibilities, home-school partnership, a learning 
organisation. 
Later, ‘basic’ studies using national data sets with large school numbers have confirmed 
these results and found that schools account for between 5% –18% of the variance in 
attainment (Sammons, 1999).  It is also found that after controlling for prior attainment and 
school composition measured in terms of eligibility for free school meals, pupils in all girls 
schools, denominational schools and specialist schools do slightly better at GCSE (Levacic, 
2002; Schagen et al., 2002).  These effects may be due to the processes associated with 
particular pupil compositions, which in turn are the result of selection into schools or may be 
due entirely to omitted pupil factors associated with the type of families choosing and being 
chosen by such schools.  
Most but not all studies confirm that school are not differentially effective for different 
types of pupil  ((Jesson and Gray, 1991; Smith and Tomlinson, 1989). Generally there is a 
  13reasonable amount of stability in secondary school effects on overall outcomes and for basic 
skills in primary schools (Sammons, 1999) but less so for subjects at secondary schools, 
between which there tends to be greater variance indicating that the effectiveness of 
departments and teachers within schools is more variable than the total school effect 
((Fitzgibbon, 1991; Sammons et al., 1997).   
An important issue for investigation is whether the school effect is due to the aggregation 
of random class level effects or whether the school as an organisational unit exerts an 
influence through its leadership and climate on teaching and learning in classrooms. There are 
few UK studies on the class effect, especially at secondary school since this requires linking 
pupils to classes, which vary by subject. There is more UK evidence for primary schools, 
where the class-teacher link can be more easily made.  For example, Blatchford et al. (2002) 
studies 368 Key Stage 1 classes in 220 schools in England and finds that for literacy 20% of 
variance is at school level, 21% at class level and the rest at pupil level after controlling for 
prior attainment and class size. For maths it was 15% and 22% respectively and 62% at pupil 
level. While ‘basic’ models of school effectiveness can, with class level data, identify the 
relative size of class level effects they cannot account for it without further evidence, in 
particular on teacher effectiveness. 
 
2.7.   Teacher effectiveness 
 
Teacher effectiveness is defined in a similar way to school effectiveness and requires 
first accounting for the effects on pupils’ learning over which the teacher has no influence. It 
is the extent to which pupils’ attainment differs from that predicted by factors beyond the 
control of the teacher, such as pupils’ prior attainment, background characteristics, school and 
class compositional effects, and resourcing (e.g. class size, other adult support in class, 
teaching materials).  The existence of differential teacher effects, which has strong anecdotal 
support, is confirmed by research (Luyten, 2003). 
Given that differential teacher effects exist, the next question is how to account for them. 
There are two foci of inquiry: one is to investigate the practices of teachers in classrooms to 
identify approaches used by more and less effective teachers; the second is to examine the 
characteristics of the teachers themselves.  From a resourcing perspective the characteristics 
of interest are cognitive ability, qualifications, experience and age – factors that are rewarded 
in the labour market. In this section we are concerned with the first focus, the second focus is 
commented in subsequent sections.   
  14In the last 30 years, there have been a handful of major studies involving observations of 
teachers in classrooms over two or more years, which record aspects of their practice
12.  These 
are then analysed with pupil progress measures and other pupil level data to find teaching 
approaches that are significantly related to pupil progress.  These studies are all of primary 
pupils reflecting the fact that a single teacher teaches a primary class for all or most of their 
lessons.  The findings of these studies are relatively consistent and have resulted in the 
advocacy of a set of ‘middle range’ strategies for teachers which are well discussed in books 
by Croll and Hastings (1996a) and Muijs and Reynolds (2001).   
From the perspective of the economics of schooling the most interesting of the research 
findings concerns teacher-pupil interactions.  The teacher typically spends 80% of her time in 
class interacting with pupils, however it is the time the pupil spends interacting with the 
teacher that appears to be key in determining the effectiveness of teaching.  When a very high 
proportion of the teacher’s time is taken up with individual pupil interactions the time each 
pupil has to interact with the teacher can be as little as 2%.  To be effective whole class 
teaching needs to engage the pupils by keeping them actively on task. The findings 
concerning the efficacy of whole class teaching (given that it still substantially less than 
100%) ran counter to the popularity in the 1970s and 1980s of pupils working on their own 
using worksheets, often seated in groups but not interacting with each other to learn.  
A more recent study of primary mathematics teaching (Muijs and Reynolds, 2000) 
supports both the existence of significant teacher effects and the positive effects on pupil of 
‘direct teaching’.  The study included 16 primary schools taking part in the Gatsby 
Mathematics Enhancement Programme, which promotes the use of direct teaching methods in 
mathematics, and 3, which were not.  Teaching the whole class was not in itself effective, but 
was when done by a teacher using the set of effective approaches.  Being taught by the most 
effective compared to least effective teachers contributed to between 11% and 25% of the 
predicted maths score depending on year group and test. Of the unexplained variance in 
attainment only between 0% and 9% was at teacher level, while a very high proportion of the 
explained variance in attainment (62% to 100%) was attributed to the fixed teacher variables.  
The research findings, coming the US in particular, concerning the efficacy of a set of teacher 
behaviours included in the ‘direct’ teaching approach have been influential in the creation of 
                                                 
12 The studies are the ORACLE project in the 1970s (Galton and Simon, 1980), the Junior Years Study 
(ILEARSB, 1986) (the only one to nest a study of teacher effectiveness within a school effectiveness study), the 
‘One in Five’ study (Croll and Moses, 1985); Primary Assessment, Curriculum and Experience Study (36 
teachers over 4 years in 18 schools) (Pollard et al 1994). 
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evaluated using experimental research designs.   
To judge teacher effectiveness and support assessment of teachers for performance 
related pay, teachers deemed to be effective and other teachers were observed, responded to 
questionnaires and so did pupils and colleagues (DfEE, 2000). The effective teaching skills 
are not dissimilar to those found in previous academic research: high expectations, time on 
task, lesson flow, planning, methods and strategies, pupil management, time and resource 
management, assessment, homework. School climate encompasses clarity, order, standards, 
fairness, pupil participation, support and feelings of safety.  These factors are consistent but 
more amplified than the strategies, which make up ‘direct teaching’. 
From an educational production perspective, it is to be expected that pupil progress is 
positively affected by the amount of time the pupil is actively engaged in learning.  Indeed 
time on task is one of the factors found to be significant in teacher effectiveness studies.  An 
important strategy is therefore to keep as many pupils as possible engaged in active learning 
concurrently and whole class direct teaching aims to achieve this.  In this way the loss of 
teacher time in larger class can be offset by more effective whole class teaching.  These 
aspects of the nature the production techniques for achieving learning provide a plausible 
explanation of the lack of consistent evidence that reducing class size improves learning 
outcomes (see below). 
A recent review of US studies on teacher effectiveness (Wayne and Young, 2003) found 
21 studies, which had an acceptable research design for inclusion in their review. Wayne and 
Youngs conclude: 
The studies confirm that students learn more from teachers with certain 
characteristics. In the case of teachers’ college ratings and test scores, positive 
relationships exist. In the case of degrees, coursework and certification findings have 
been inconclusive except in mathematics where high school students clearly learn more 
from teachers with certification in mathematics and course work related to mathematics 
p. 107). 
 
2.8.  The Economics of Public Sector School Provision. 
Comparing schools requires some clear measure of school performance, which relies on 
student attainment as the main outcome measure.  Many educational researchers have come to 
the conclusion that the ‘student level gain score’ (or value added) measure of student 
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prior to the period when the educational performance is observed.   
There are other subtle ways in which the inputs and outputs of the education production 
process are difficult to observe. The raw material, or input, a teacher works with is highly 
variable.  It is well known that the problems of teaching the same material to children from 
poor homes in deprived area is more difficult than teaching to motivated children from middle 
class homes. Even if one tries to measure ‘value-added’ in terms of improvement of exam 
scores these can be a distortion of the improvement in attainment as such a calculation 
assumes that other factors and their influence are fixed over time (typically family inputs are 
not fixed across homes). Another important limitation of naïve achievement gains models is 
that a pupil’s learning may not be apparent until years after their schooling. Often the value of 
what is learnt by the pupil is not apparent, used or tested until several years after. 
There is now widespread evidence that incentives work in education.  The issue is 
designing incentives structures that are not subject to distortion or ‘gaming’. The education 
production process is very reliant on teacher labour as the most important factor of 
production.  In practice it is very difficult to write complete labour contracts in education to 
generate the appropriate incentives from teachers. To a large extent this is a principal-agent 
problem.  However there are several extra dimensions to this problem in education.  
The essential problem of public sector educational provision is that education is not a 
single output and any education system must have multiple goals.  Dixit (2000) lists the 
multiple goals of public education as: 
1)  Imparting basic skills of literacy, mathematics and science for communication, 
reasoning, and calculation. 
  2)  Fostering the emotional and physical growth of children. 
3)  Preparing students for work, by teaching them vocational skills and attitudes 
suitable for employment. 
4)  Preparing them for life, by teaching them skills of health and financial 
management. 
5)  Preparing them for society, by instilling ideals of citizenship and 
responsibility. 
6)  Helping them to overcome disadvantageous circumstances at home, including 
in many cases poor nutrition and poor study environments. 
7)  Providing an environment free from drugs and violence. 
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environment. Dixit suggests that although these goals are not mutually contradictory they do 
compete for resources.  To this degree they are alternative outputs in the educational 
production process and teacher effort put into one of these objectives may detract wholly, or 
in part, from one or more of the other goals. The general result from the principal-agent 
literature is that the agent will have an incentive to divert effort away from the less accurately 
measured task. Hence it is shown that if the principal wishes the agent to allocate effort 
towards a task that is not easily measured then incentives on the measurable tasks must be 
weakened.  
The second essential feature of any education system is that it has multiple principals. As 
a consequence the actions of any individual teacher (agent), could be affected by many other 
people (principals) who are in a position of influence. Most specifically the wishes of parents, 
head teachers, teacher unions, local or federal authorities, taxpayers, employers, religious and 
ethnic pressure groups, governors and even pupils may influence the actions and decisions of 
individual teachers. However, Dixit (1997) shows (under regularity conditions) that the 
existence of several principals makes the overall incentives for the agent much weaker.  This 
weakening of incentives occurs because each principal will seek to divert the agent’s effort to 
his most preferred dimension.  Obviously the more principals that are involved with 
competing interests the more diluted will be the incentive structure for the agent.  
 
2.9.   Accountability in Schools. 
In the UK, the system of accountability in school works through: the publication of 
school examination results, the (theoretical) right of parents to send their children to any state 
school, the presence of parent governors on school governing bodies, and regular school 
inspection by OFSTED to monitor standards.  
What might be the consequences of this accountable public education system? To answer 
this we need to be more precise about what we mean by accountability.  The concept of 
accountability is a difficult one.  Fearon (1999) suggested that ‘one person, A, (the agent) is 
accountable to another B (the principal), if two conditions are met.  First, there is an 
understanding that A is obliged to act in some way on behalf of B.  Second, B is empowered 
by some formal institution or perhaps informal rules to sanction or reward A for her activities 
or performance in this capacity.’ 
Any system of accountability should create incentives – although such incentives may 
not always have desirable consequences.  It is unclear whether the mere publication of 
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allocation.  Surely a necessary (but not sufficient condition) for such efficiency, is that this 
accountability be directly linked to the power of consumers to choose alternative providers in 
a competitive market.  Dolton (2002b) suggests that effective accountability in education 
necessitates: 
i)  that the education system provides consumers with full information to make 
decisions. 
ii)  that consumers have the power to influence the balance of priorities across the 
multiple goals of educational provision. 
iii)  that the consumers have the means to choose alternative providers in a 
competitive or quasi-competitive environment 
iv)  that any incentives which operate on education providers do not act to distort 
their incentives regarding their provision in ways which are counter to the wishes of 
consumers. 
 
A definition of accountability which includes customers wishes relies on: being able to 
identify who these customers are; identifying correctly what their views are; aggregating their 
views into a consensus to establish what the ranking of priorities is; and then implementing 
these views effectively.   
We also have to assume that the views of parents are responsible and representative of 
the whole customer base.  Such an assumption may be unrealistically ideal.  Aoki and Feiner 
(1996) discuss how the parents views which are more effectively heard are disproportionately 
those who live in affluent areas, are more highly educated and have higher status occupations.  
Such evidence means that establishing precisely who an educational system is accountable to, 
and what is the mechanism for the transmission of the influence, is important.  Most 
concretely, are the customers for education the parents or the pupils? Undoubtedly the 
priorities of the pupils, if consulted, may be different to their parents. 
At the heart of effective public service provision is the possibility of competition 
amongst providers.  Unless there are alternative schools for parents to send their children to 
there is no incentive mechanism for each school to compete in the quasi market.  Another 
problem with this model is if there are private schools outside the public sector.  In the 
context of the present system where private and state schools co-exist, there is the ‘exit and 
voice’ (see Hirschman (1970)) issue. This problem is that there will not be an effective 
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the private schools rather than ‘voice’ their views in an attempt to change the state schools.  
 
2.10.  Class size evidence 
 
Reductions in class size have the advantage of being visible, easily understood and easy 
(but costly) to implement and benefit from the broad support of parents. As an example of its 
popularity with parents, most private schools advertise their lower class size compared to state 
schools.  Whilst most agents advocate smaller class sizes, there is little evidence that it 
benefits pupils. Pupil teacher ratios have fallen at all levels of schooling up to the early 
Nineties before increasing, concomitantly with the excess demand for teachers (see Figure 3).  
Other components of school quality exist and most of the literature has concentrated on 
easily observable measures such as expenditure per-child, pupil/teacher ratio and teacher’s 
experience, qualification or pay. Since teachers’ salary are nationally determined on a pay 
scale with a yearly increment, variation in average teacher salary mostly reflects the teachers’ 
seniority rather than their quality or the local labour market conditions thus, our decision to 
focus on class size as a measure of school quality. 
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  202.11.  Modeling school quality 
Various strategies have been used to estimate educational quality effects
13. The first and 
maybe more direct is to focus on measures of the pupil educational attainment. Alternatively, 
one may prefer capturing long term effects and estimate the impact of school quality on 
earnings. Let us define Yi as the outcome of interest and Qis as the measure of schooling 
quality.  Model (1) imposes that quality produces the same shift in wages for all individuals 
over and above any effect that quality may have on schooling achievement (Si). Xis is a vector 
of individual i and school s characteristics and may include ability, as in a value added model.  
Model 1:   is is i is X S Q Ln µ ρ γ β + + + = is Y   
Model (2) relaxes the assumption that the effect of quality on earnings is the same at all 
level of education, by including an interaction term between quality and schooling attainment. 
Model 2:   is is i is i is X S Q S Q Ln µ ρ δ γ β + + + + = is Y   
Whilst allowing for heterogeneity in the effect of quality on earnings, Model 2 may still 
underestimate the effect of schooling quality if higher quality schooling induces pupils to 
remain in education longer. To capture the total effect of schooling quality on earnings, a 
simple reduced form model can be estimated. 
Model 3:   is is is X Q Ln µ ρ β + + = is Y   
Model 3 is the most flexible model, but does not allow researchers to conclude on the 
origin of the quality effect.   
The main difficulty in estimating the effect of quality on schooling achievement or 
wages comes from the endogeneity of the schooling quality variables. Parents and schools 
take decisions regarding the school and class attended by the young person, so that quality is 
randomly allocated to a pupil. Schools may stream students and allocate students with more 
difficulties to smaller classes in order to prevent them disturbing more able pupils (as implied 
by Lazear, 2001) or to provide them with more teacher’s attention. Iacovou (2002), 
reproduced in Figure 4, provides evidence that schools allocate lower ability individuals to 
sized classes thus, pupils in smaller classes may have lower achievement. 
Figure 4 shows the distribution of class size in English at age 16 by ability stream. For 
schools not practicing streaming, the distribution of class size follows a normal distribution 
and the median size is around 28.  For schools streaming by ability, the distributions are 
skewed and the median class size for pupils in the bottom stream is 20, but reaches 30 for 
                                                 
13 For a complete exposure of the difficulties in modelling quality effects, the interested reader is referred to 
Todd and Wolpin (2003) or Vignoles et al. (2000) for a UK review. 
  21pupils in the top stream. A strategy to reduce endogeneity problems is to aggregate the quality 
data, to the school, LEA or even state level. The aggregation strategy may lead to biased 
estimates (Hanushek et al.,1996). 
 
Figure 4: Distribution of Class size in English by Stream 
  Note: Source: Iacovou (2002) 
 
2.12.  Quality and educational performance 
The British literature has mostly focused on the National Child Development Study 
(NCDS) a longitudinal survey of all the children born during the first week of March 1958. 
The NCDS contains a wealth of information on parental background, school characteristics 
but also ability.  
 
A- School data 
Rather than using individual data, school level data can be used to estimate the effect of 
quality on pupils’ achievements. Two early papers using this approach were Bee and Dolton 
(1985a and 1985b).  These papers rely on a rich dataset on independent schools in the UK to 
provide evidence of resourcing effects in terms of pupil teacher ratios on school outputs, and 
costs and economies of scale effects. More recently, Graddy and Stevens (2003) constructed a 
sample consisting of 267 secondary private schools observed over the period 1988 to 1994. 
One advantage of a private school sample is that endogeneity due to parental choice is 
reduced since all have a high interest in the education of their children (mean annual fees are 
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heterogeneous, within schools students tend to be fairly homogenous. The authors focus on an 
elitist measure of achievement at 18: the proportion of A-grades at A-levels and estimate an 
elasticity of pupil-teacher ratio of 0.36. These results hold when school fixed effects are 
introduced and also within school.  
Bradley and Taylor (1998) map school league tables with school characteristics for all 
secondary schools in England over the period 1992-1996. Pooling all data they find no effect 
for teaching staff characteristics (hours of support staff per pupil, percentage of qualified 
teachers and pupil/teacher ratio) either individually or jointly. When estimating the 
determinants in the improvement of the proportion of students reaching 5 GCSE at grades A* 
to C over the period, they estimate that an increase in the pupil/teacher ratio by one pupil, 
increases the performance of the school by 0.4 percentage point.  
A drawback of school level data is the limited information available to control for pupil 
characteristics and the endogeneity of the quality measures. These problems can be reduced 
by including school fixed effects, but then it is unclear what the driving force of the change in 
quality over time are; for example, is the pupil-teacher ratio improving because pupils are 
disappointed with the school and leave it, or does it reflect a strategy of the school of 
recruiting more teachers? Keeping these caveats in mind, school level data provides some 
evidence of weak effects of quality on achievement. 
 
B- Evidence based on individual data 
Most studies rely on the NCDS and estimate the effect of school quality for England and 
Wales
14, the exception being McVicar (2001) who uses a small survey of school leavers in 
Northern Ireland. Studies based on the NCDS generally claim that the richness of the data 
allows to control for parental characteristics, family, school and neighbourhood characteristics 
and thus reduces the endogeneity problem. This assumption is confirmed by Feinstein and 
Symons (1999). Using local authorities dummies to instrument pupil-teacher ratio they 
conclude that after including controls for family, school and neighbourhood background, the 
endogeneity bias of the pupil teacher ratio is not an issue when estimating its effect on test 
score.  
                                                 
14 Scotland and Northern Ireland are dropped in most studies including local information since local education 
authorities data for these provinces are not obtainable on a consistent basis.  Differences between the Scottish 
and the English and Welsh education system would make National interpretation of the results problematic. 
  23The UK studies confirm the overwhelming importance of prior attainment/ability and 
family background variables in determining educational attainment. Dearden et al. (2002) 
provide an extensive analysis on the effect of school quality on educational attainment, wages 
and wage growth. Their measure of quality is the pupil teacher ratio measured at the school 
level. They also control for the school type (selective private, selective public and single sex 
school), ability, using tests at age 7 and 11, and family background.  School quality has no 
effect on qualification nor years of post-compulsory education (Harmon and Walker, 2000).  
Rather than looking at the highest qualification obtained, Dustmann, Rajah and Van 
Soest (2003) estimate the effect of school quality on the probability of staying past 
compulsory schooling age and suggest that the effect may be non-linear. Contrary to the 
previous studies, Dustmann et al. find a significant effect of school quality on the staying on 
decision; increasing the teacher-pupil ratio by one standard deviation, leads to a decrease in 
the probability of staying on of 4 percentage points. Despite increasing the probability of 
staying on post-compulsory education, school quality has no effect on the numbers of O-
levels taken. The effect of class size on participation in post-compulsory schooling is 
significant and tends to be stronger for boys
15. However, it is dwarfed by the effect of school 
type. Attending a grammar or a private school increases the probability of staying on by 12 
and 17 percentage points respectively.  
Heterogeneity in the effect of pupil teacher ratio is also found by Mc Vicar (2001) in his 
study of the decision to stay on among Northern Ireland School Leavers (1993). Despite the 
small sample size and lack of controls for previous achievement
16, McVicar reports that the 
pupil-teacher ratio has a counter-intuitive effect on the decision to follow the academic track 
but a significant negative effect on the choice of a vocational qualification. This suggests that 
the effect of school quality is non-linear and is more relevant for pupils with lower ability or a 
lower ‘taste for schooling’. The effect of quality on taste for schooling is also supported by 
Dustmann et al. (2003).  For males, reducing class size by one, reduces the probability of 
truancy by 2 percentage points.  This result does not hold for women. 
Accounting for the endogeneity of the pupil teacher ratio (using LEA dummies) but also 
parental interest in the child (using interest at age 7) and peer effects (LEA mean 
                                                 
15 For boys increasing the pupil/teacher ratio is also associated with an increase in the probability of joining a 
training scheme while for girls it leads to a higher proportion joining the labour force. 
16 The lack of ability measure is compensated by the inclusion of school type dummies. Northern Ireland schools 
are characterised by segregation along ability and religion.  While 5% in pupils in the Britain are in grammar 
schools, this proportion is 30% in NI. Children are tested at age 11 in order to enter a grammar school.  This 
sorting provides some controls for previous ability. However, parents have also the choice of sending their child 
to schools of different type: schools can be Catholic, Protestant or non-religious. This choice affects the funding 
of the school, peer effect and potentially other characteristics observables or not of the schools.  
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estimates. For both English and Mathematics, the authors are unable to find a significant 
effect of the pupil-teacher ratio. Iacovou (2002) on the other hand, relying on the interaction 
between school size and school type, as an exogenous variable, estimate a reduced form 
model of the effect of class-size on reading achievement at age 7. Reducing class size by one 
pupil increases the reading score by 0.036 of a standard deviation. This is 50% larger than 
increasing maternal education by one year. Surprisingly, class size is found to have no effect 
on mathematical achievement at age 7. Iacovou suggests that the mathematical test at 7 may 
not capture mathematical ability since it is less correlated with mathematical achievement at 
age 11 and 16 than the age 7 reading test. But this could also indicate that the identification 
strategy is not valid. Also, the positive effect of class size on reading at age 7 is homogenous, 
and no difference can be found by gender or social background. Even more surprisingly, 
reduction in class size has similar effect for large (above 30 pupils) and small classes. The 
effect of class size fades and by age 11, having been in a smaller class at age 7 has no longer 
any significant effect on achievement.   
Finally, relying on the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) for 
evidence of class size effects in secondary schools, Chevalier (2003) using teacher shortage 
and lack of physical space in the school as instruments for teacher ratio estimate the following 
effects: for men, decreasing the pupil teacher ratio by 10% (1.5 pupils at the mean) would 
increase test scores by 4 to 6 points (1% at the mean score). For women, the estimates are 
closer to zero and insignificant.  The effect of teacher resources on test scores is not 
economically insignificant. 
 
C  Recent class size studies 
Two recent class size studies have found this variable to be negatively and significantly 
related to pupil attainment in primary schools.  Blatchford et al. (2002) using longitudinal data 
studied over 9000 children in the first three years of school (ages 4 to 7) in 368 classes in 220 
schools in England. Two measures of output are used – a Literacy Baseline test and a 
specially developed test of numeracy (maths). Control variables are the prior attainment 
(baseline) tests in literacy and maths, child’s term of entry to school, age, gender and 
eligibility for free school meals (an indicator of family poverty). Class size was recorded in 
each term and the average class size over the school year used as the appropriate measure. 
The methodology is notable for using multilevel modelling and for non-linear modelling of 
class size. In both literacy and maths there was a larger effect of smaller classes on low 
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attainers, there was little further negative impact of larger classes above 22
17. The authors 
report that a decrease in class size of 10, at sizes below 25, was associated with a gain of 
about 1-year in the achievement of low attainers and of 5 months for other pupils. Preliminary 
analysis indicated that an increased number of adults in the class (e.g. teaching assistants) had 
no effect on attainment.  
Dolton (2002a) is the first to attempt to isolate the disruptive element associated with 
the peer group effects in classes streamed by ability.  By use of class list data he computes a 
proxy index variable for disruption using the number of pupils in that class with special 
educational needs. His results provide limited evidence from one school in which pupils are 
streamed for Match classes but not for English.  He finds that without the disruptive index a 
pupil attainment equation has a counterintuitive sign on class size.  However controlling for 
the disruption index, the smaller classes produce better pupil attainment (having conditioned 
for attendance, family background and other factors).  This paper provides first limited 
evidence of the Lazear (2001) conjecture on the importance of peer group effects for 
educational production function mis-specification. 
To conclude, studies in the UK find weak evidence that for younger children, smaller 
class sizes are associated with higher test scores but these effects are not permanent and 
disappear as the pupil ages. Smaller class size is associated with other positive outcomes. 
Pupils, especially boys, taught in smaller classes are less likely to truant and more likely to 
invest in post-compulsory schooling. The effect of school quality also appears to be non-
linear with lower achievers benefiting the most.  
 
2.13.  Returns to school quality 
While quality of schooling has little effect on educational achievement, it may have 
some long-term impact on labour market outcomes; if for example, the quality of schooling 
has a positive impact on non-cognitive skills. The US literature on the effect of school quality 
on wages has reported mixed results. Card and Krueger (1992) found large returns to 
schooling quality, measured at the State level, but these effects disappeared when relying on 
individual data regarding schooling quality (Betts, 1995)
18.   
 
                                                 
17 Class sizes above 35 were not included in the study. 
18 For recent surveys on American evidences on school quality effects see Krueger (2003) and Hanushek (2003). 
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Little evidence exists in the UK that relates pupil labour market performance with the 
level of educational resources devoted to their education in financial terms, partly due to the 
lack of appropriate data. Replicating Card and Krueger (1992) using the NCDS, Campbell 
(2001) implements a two-stage strategy where returns to education at age 33 are estimated 
separately by LEA. In a second stage the estimated coefficients on the LEA dummies become 
the independent variable and are regressed on LEA characteristics reflecting school quality 
and the labour market. While the author reports variations in the returns to education by LEA, 
none of the measures of quality (pupil-teacher ratio, expenditure per pupil, teacher salary, 
proportion of pupils in Grammar or single sex schools) is significant.  While quality of 
schooling differs between LEAs, as measured by disparity in wages, it is unclear which 
characteristics matter. Aggregate data are not informative about the mechanism by which the 
education production function can be improved. 
Dolton et al. (1999) using the Youth Cohort Surveys (YCS) find that where Local 
Education Authority expenditure per pupil was higher, individuals were less likely to be 
unemployed on leaving school.  Further work by Dolton et al. (2003) has suggested that 
school resources have stronger effects on school outcomes than labour market outcomes but 
that the latter are still evident. 
B- Individual level data 
The most recent and econometrically sophisticated studies from the UK have used the 
NCDS.  At age 33 but not 23, school quality affect wages, however, these quality effects 
disappear when controlling for qualifications (Dearden et al. 2002, Dolton and Vignoles, 
1999, Harmon and Walker, 2000)
19. So schooling quality impact of wage growth but only 
through its effects on qualification obtained. For women, reducing pupil teacher ratio by 1 
increases wages at 33 by 1%. This effect of attending a small class is stronger for low ability 
female.    
Dustmann et al. (2003) contest the conclusion that pupil teacher ratio has no effect on 
adults’ wages, and claim that this result is driven by the estimation strategy. Using a reduced 
form, as in the rest of the literature, they report negative but insignificant effect of the pupil 
teacher ratio on wages. However, a “structural model”, where the effect of class size on the 
probability of staying on post-compulsory schooling and the impact of post-compulsory 
                                                 
19 The absence of positive effect at age 23 is an artefact: pupils in higher quality schools get more education and 
have therefore less work experience. Since the wage profile is steep early on, the reduced labour market 
experience of pupils in selective schools could negate any positive effect of school quality on earnings. 
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33 and 42 and for both gender, increasing class size by one pupil reduces wages by 0.3%.  A 
reduction of class size by 5 pupils has a mean present value of £3,800 (2003 prices). This 
estimate may be biased downwards by as much as 50% since Harmon and Walker (2000) 
have shown that returns to post-compulsory schooling are underestimated by 50% when 
estimated by OLS 
In their structural model, Dustmann et al. (2003) impose the assumption that the class 
size effect on wages operates solely through the effect of class size on qualification. Dearden 
et al. (2002) test an alternative, where class size may affect attachment to the labour force. 
Rather than relying on the history of labour force participation, the author focus on a single 
point in time and do not find any effect of school quality on participation to the labour force at 
age 33.  
To summarise this section on the returns to quality of education, most studies have 
found insignificant or a marginally positive effect of educational quality on earnings. As 
demonstrated by Dustmann et al., the lack of significance of the estimate may be due to 
modelling strategy. Dustmann et al. recommends using a structural model rather than the 
reduced form model. Also, evidence based on the NCDS may be dated.  The educational 
system has changed compared to the one in placed in the 1970s. Class sizes in primary 
schools were about 28 compared with 22 currently. Furthermore, the NCDS was the first 
cohort affected by the raising of the compulsory school leaving age, which means that the 
labour market would have been supply-constrained especially for individuals with low 
skills
20. Those who went to university were also affected by a macro-economic shock, as they 
reached the labour market in 1979, the first year of the recession. In the following three years, 
unemployment rose from 1 to 3 million. These two macro-economic shocks may have 
undermined any positive effect that school quality had on wages. 
 
2.14.   The Hedonic Model 
The absence of clear quality effect may be due to researchers not focusing on the correct 
measures of quality. It is possible that quality of schooling is not directly observable to the 
researchers but that parents have better information. Parents’ decision to dwell is affected by 
various characteristics of the neighbourhood; low crime, shopping, amenities, but in a system 
                                                 
20 Nickell (1993) provide evidence that the number of school leavers during the academic year when the new 
school leaving age was implemented was half the usual number 
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21, the quality of the local school is likely to be 
an important determinant.  Hence, a hedonic property price model can be used to estimate the 
value that parents attach to school quality. Hedonic price models are extremely sensitive to 
omitted variable bias. Any unobserved amenity biases the estimate of the school effect. Also, 
some characteristics of the neighbourhood, peer effects for example, are endogenous to the 
school quality. Thus, instrumental variables are used to estimate the effect of school quality 
on house price. Two such studies are reviewed here, which value quality in primary schools 
(Gibbons and Machin, 2003) and secondary schools (Rosenthal, 2003) in England. 
Gibbons and Machin use average price for four property types at the postcode level and 
compare adjacent postal sectors (to eliminate neighbourhood effect). The instruments for 
school quality are the school denomination (public or church based) and the age range 
covered. Accounting for endogeneity, the impact of school quality on the average house price 
doubles
22.  Increasing the average test score in the area by 5 percentage points adds 4.4% to 
the value of the average house in the South East and the North of England, and 2.7% in the 
South West of England.   
Rosenthal (2003) maps individual data on individual house prices (from a nationally 
representative Building Society) to the nearest non-selective public school
23. This detailed 
dataset allows him to control for the dwelling characteristics and local area fixed effects. The 
instrument for school quality is whether the school was inspected for quality in the last two 
years
24. Rosenthal’s estimates of the effect of school quality on house price are 1/10 of those 
found on primary school by Gibbons and Machin. Some of the difference may be due to 
parents valuing a primary school more since an early intervention has higher returns but part 
of the discrepancy between these two studies is likely to stem from differences in the data and 
modelling. While parents value school quality these studies do not allow us to put a precise 
value on school quality.   
Additionally, Gibbons (2002) finds that pupils located in schools in higher income areas 
did significantly better than pupils in schools in less well off areas. However, once the 
specific characteristics of the area are taken into account (especially neighbourhood 
                                                 
21 Living within the catchment area of a school is not the only criteria used by school and may not guarantee a 
place at the school of choice, it nevertheless increases the odd substantially (see Gibbons and Machin, 2003 or 
Rosenthal, 2003 for a detailed description of the school selection process in England). 
22 Gibbons and Machin (2003) suggest that omitted neighbourhood characteristics bias is not important and that, 
on the contrary, OLS are biased downwards because of the noise components of the school quality measure. 
23 Rosenthal (2003) discuss this issue in detail. To summarise, 15% of schools discriminate by ability, sex or 
religion and are omitted from the sample of schools used. 
24 Inspection is related to the school quality since schools prepare themselves when informed that an inspection 
is imminent but independent of the neighbourhood characteristics 
  29composition and residential selection on prior school performance), the relationship between 
average incomes and school performance disappears. In other words, it is the characteristics 
of the people living in a particular area, not the incomes they earn, that determine school 
performance. Gibbons finds a wrongly signed negative relationship between number of 
teachers per pupil in schools and pupil attainments, even allowing for prior attainment, local 
area characteristics and other factors. However, allowing for lagged school performance, a 
weak significant positive effects from teacher inputs, and indeed from higher educational 
expenditure are estimated. However, these resource variables are not nearly as important as 
other variables, including location variables. The latter explain around five times as much of 
variance in primary school performance as do the resource variables. He also notes the small 
magnitude of the resource effects. A one standard deviation increase in the number of 
qualified teachers per 100 pupils (0.486 in 98/99) would increase average school performance 
by just around 1.3 percentage points and cost around £360 million. An additional expenditure 
of 10% per pupil would cost around £684 million, and generate an increase in average school 
performance of just 0.4 percentage points. 
 
2.15.  Selective schools 
As in the US, returns to selective schools are controversial. For example, Dustmann et 
al. (2003) estimate that even after accounting for age 7 and 11 test performance and parental 
interest, pupils attending grammar or private schools obtain 0.8 more O-levels than pupils in 
comprehensive schools. Similarly, Dearden et al. (2002) estimate large financial returns for 
attending a selective school for men but not women. This premium subsists even when 
controlling for highest qualification obtained. For example, Naylor et al. (2002), estimate that 
university graduates who went to an independent school receive and earnings premium of 3% 
compared to other university graduates. This premium is driven by the top 20% schools and is 
positively related to the fees but not to observed measures of school quality. 
Harmon and Walker (2000) dispute these findings and find that attending a grammar 
school only had a positive effect on earnings for individuals with low mathematical ability. 
While this sounds laudable it is rather suspicious that individuals with low math ability at age 
7 would have passed the entrance exam for grammar school. This suggests that either math 
score at age 7 is not a good predictor of future math performance or that this estimate is 
biased by lack of common support. Additionally, the lack of effect of selective schooling on 
post-compulsory schooling attainment and wages may also relate to the controlling for peer 
  30effects. Naylor et al. (2002) also found that the distribution of parental social class was a 
significant determinant of the independent school earning premium. 
Since education at a more selective school is not random, Dearden et al. (2002) are 
concerned that there results may be driven by a lack of common support, and estimate by 
propensity score matching the effect on adult earnings of attending a selective school. Whilst 
90% of the treated observations are matched, the estimates are rather imprecise: attending a 
selective school increased the wages at age 33 of males by 10% and females by 3.5% 
(Treatment on the treated).  
In the UK, children attending selective schools in the Seventies appear to have later on 
in life more positive outcomes than their peers. Whether the positive effect of selective school 
is due to better teachers, a more efficient organisation of the school or simply a peer effect is 
an important issue that needs to be explored in order to improve schools all over the country. 
Accounting for initial ability and family background, grouping pupils by ability is associated 
with large positive effects. For example, Feinstein and Symons (1999) estimates that after 
accounting for the endogeneity of these variables, a better peer group, streaming or grammar 
school increases test scores in English at age 16 by 9%, 3.5% and 7% respectively.  
 
2.16.  Conclusions. 
Although the market led reforms of the education system have – for the most part – 
worked well in the UK in terms of creating incentives in the system to improve performance 
in schools - there are clear signs of the problems they created. At the time of writing, changes 
in the formula funding schools have led to many schools being virtually bankrupt and left 
them with no choice but make some teachers redundant during the summer of 2003.  In 
addition there are still large scale problems in the principle of ‘free choice’ in inner city areas, 
especially London.  Clearly the incentive advantages of devolving decision making down to 
the level of the school are accompanied by problems which are yet to be solved. 
What makes a school successful is still unclear. Whilst educationalists have pinpointed 
at school ethos and class room organization, economists have found mixed results for 
characteristics that are more easily observable. So far, at best, the pupil teacher ratio has been 
found to have a limited positive impact which is dwarfed by the effect of other school 
characteristics like selection. Before advocating that tracking should be implemented it would 
be desirable to assess the relative effect of pupils teacher ratio and selection, not only at the 
mean but for the whole population of pupils. Similarly, the characteristics that make a good 
teachers are not easily observable by researchers and do not include those that are used to 
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teachers since there are some evidence that they are ready to pay a premium to dwell in the 
vicinity of a good school. 
Finally, the overwhelming majority of research summarized here is based on the 
experience of the 1958 cohort when the British schooling system faced a different 
environment compared to most recent cohort. In order to estimate the current production 
function of schools, there is an urgent need for a linked pupil, teacher and school panel dataset 
with which researchers could disentangle the effect of peer group, class size and teacher 
quality. Such datasets have recently been created in other countries and will be becoming 
available in the UK in the near future. 
 
  32References 
 
Adnett, N and Davies, P. (2002) ‘Markets for Schooling’, Routledge, London. 
Aoki, M. and Feiner, S. (1996) ‘The Economics of Market Choice and At-Risk Students’, in 
Becker, W and W Baumol. (Eds) ‘Assessing Educational Practices: The 
Contribution of Economics’, Russell Sage Foundation. 
Barlett, W. (1993) ‘Quasi-markets and education reform’, Chapter 6 in ‘ Quasi-markets and 
social policy’ edited by LeGrand J., Barlett W., McMilland 
Barber, M. (1996) ‘The Learning Game’, Gollancz, London. 
Bee, M. and Dolton, P. (1985a) ‘Costs and economies of scale in UK private schools’,   
Applied Economics, vol.17, pp281-90. 
Bee, M. and Dolton, P. (1985b) ‘Educational production in independent secondary schools’,  
Bulletin of Economic Research, vol.37, no.1, pp27-40. 
Betts J., 1995, Does school quality matter? Evidence from the NLSY, Review of Economics 
and Statistics, 62, 231-250 
Blatchford, P., Goldstein, H., Martin, C. and Browne, W.  (2002) 'A study of class size effects 
in English school reception year classes' British Educational Research Journal, 
vol.28, no.2, pp.171-187. 
Bradley, S., Johnes, G. and Millington, J. (2001) ‘School Choice, Competition and the 
Efficiency of Secondary Schools in England’, European Journal of Operational 
Research, vol.135, pp527-544. 
Bradley S. and J. Taylor (1998), The effect of school size on exam performance in secondary 
schools, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 60, 291-325 
Bradley S. and J. Taylor (2002), The effect of the quasi-market on the efficiency –equity 
trade-off in the secondary school sector, Bulletin of Economic Research, 54, 295-314 
Campbell D., 2001, ‘Rates of return to schooling and the quality of education in England and 
Wales’, University of Kent, Discussion Paper 
Card, D. and Krueger, A. (1992) ‘Does school quality matter? Returns to education and the 
characteristics of public schools in the United States’, Journal of Political Economy, 
Vol. 100, 1-40 
Chevalier A. (2003) ‘Class size effects in English test achievement: evidence from PISA’, 
Institute for the Study of Social Change, University College Dublin, mimeo 
Chubb, J and Moe, T. (1990) ‘Politics, Markets and America’s Schools’,  Washingon DC, 
The Brookings Institution. 
Croll, P. and Hastings, N. (1996b) Teachers matter chapter 1. In Croll, P. and Hastings, N. 
(Eds) Effective Primary Teaching: research based classroom strategies.  London: 
David Fulton. 
Dearden L., J. Ferri and C. Meghir, 2002, The effect of school quality on educational 
attainment and wages, The Review of Economics and Statistics, 84, 1-20 
DfEE (2000) Research into Teacher Effectiveness: a model of teacher effectiveness. London: 
DfEE. 
DfEE (2001) ‘Schools: Building on Success’, DfEE London. 
DfES (2001) ‘Schools: Achieving Success’ DFES, London. 
Dixit, A (1997) ‘Power of Incentives in Public versus Private Organisations’, American 
Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, vol.87(2), pp.378-382. 
Dixit, A. (2000) ‘Incentives and Organisations in the Public Sector: An Interpretative 
Review’, University of Princeton, mimeo. 
Dolton, P. (2002a) ‘Evaluating Education Inclusion’, University of Newcastle-upon-Tyne, 
mimeo. 
  33Dolton, P. (2002b) ‘Improving Educational Quality: How Best to Evaluate Our Schools? A 
Discussion.’  p.225-236 in ‘Education in the 21
st Century’,  47
th Economic 
Conference, Boston Federal Reserve Bank. 
Dolton, P., R. Levacic and A. Vignoles. (2003) The Economic Effects of School Quality’ 
Chapter 3 in  ‘Human Capital and the Life Cycle: a European Perspective’ 
forthcoming , Edward Elgar. 
Dolton, P, Makepeace, G, Hutton, S and Audas, R. (1999) 'Making the Grade: Education, 
the labour market and young people', Joseph Rowntree Foundation, York. 
Dolton P. and A. Vignoles, (1999), ‘The impact of school quality on labor market success in 
the UK’, University of Newcastle, DP 
Dolton, P. and Vignoles, A. (2002a) The Return to Post Compulsory Mathematics Study’ 
(with Anna Vignoles), Economica, vol.69, pp113-141. 
Dolton, P. and Vignoles, A. (2002b) Is a Broader Curriculum Better, Economics of 
Education Review, vol.21, no.5, pp.415-429. (with A.Vignoles). 
Dustmann C., N. Rajah and A. van Soest, (2003), ‘Class size, education and wages’, The 
Economic Journal, vol.113, F99-F120 
Fearon, J. (1999) ‘Electoral Accountability and the Control of Politicians: Selecting Good 
Types verses Sanctioning Poor Performance’, in Przeworski, A. Stokes, S. and Manin, 
B. (eds) (1999) 
Feinstein L. and J. Symons, (1999), Attainment in secondary schools, Oxford Economic 
Papers, 51, 300-321 
Fitzgibbon, C. (1991) Multilevel modelling in an indicator system. In Raudenbush, S. W. and 
Willms, J. D. (Eds) Schools, Classrooms and Pupils: International Studies from a 
Multilevel Perspective,.  San Diego: Academic Press. 
Gibbons S., 2002, Geography, resources and primary school performance, Centre for the 
Economics of Education, LSE, DP 25 
Gibbons S. and S. Machin, 2003, Valuing primary education, Journal of Urban Economics, 
(forthcoming) 
Glennerster, H. (1991) ‘Quasi-Markets for Education?’, Economic Journal, vol.101, 
pp.1268-1276. 
Glennerster, H. (2001)  
Glennerster, H. (2002)  
Glennerster, H. (2003) ‘Understnading the Finance of Welfare: What Welfare Costs and 
How to Pay for It’,  The Policy Press, London. 
Goldstein, H. (1997) 'Methods in school effectiveness research'. School Effectiveness and 
School Improvement Vol 8, No. 4 369-395. 
Graddy K. and M. Stevens, 2003, The impact of school inputs on students performance: An 
empirical study of private schools in the UK, University of Oxford, DP 146 
Gundlach, E, , Woessman, L. and Gmelin, J. (2001) ‘The Decline of Schooling Productivity 
in OECD Countries’,  Economic Journal, vol.11, pp.C135-147. 
Hanushek, E. (1997) ‘Assessing the effects of school resources on student performance: an 
update’ Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, 19, 141-64 
Hanushek E., 2003, The failure of input-based schooling policies, The Economic Journal, 
103, F64-F98 
Hanushek E., S. Rivkin and L. Taylor, 1996, Aggregation and the estimated effects of school 
resources, Review of Economics and Statistics, 78, 611-27 
Harmon C. and I. Walker, 2000, The returns to the quantity and quality of education: 
Evidence for men in England and Wales, Economica, 67, 19-35 
Hirschman, A. (1970) ‘Exit, Voice and Loyalty’, Harvard University Press. Cambridge, 
Mass. 
  34Hoxby C. (1997), How the changing market structure of US Higher Education explains 
college tuition, National Bureau of Economic Research, WP 6323 
Iacovou M., 2002, Class size in the early years: is smaller really better, Education 
Economics, 10, 261-291 
Inner London Education Authority Research and Statistics Branch (1986)) The Junior 
School Project:  Part C Understanding School Effectiveness. London: ILEA. 
Jacob B., 2002, Where the boys aren’t: Non-cognitive skills, returns to school and the gender 
gap in higher education, National Bureau of Economic Research, WP 8964 
Jesson, D. and Gray, J. (1991) 'Slants on slopes: using multilevel models to investigate 
differential school effectiveness and its impact on school examination results'. School 
Effectiveness and School Improvement Vol 2, No. 3 230-271. 
Krueger A., 2003, Economic consideration and class size, The Economic Journal, 103, F34-
F63 
Lazear, E. (2001) ‘Educational Production’,  Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol.CXVI, 
no.3, pp.777-804.  
Levacic (2002) 'The effectiveness of specialist schools in England: rhetoric and reality'. 
British Educational Research Association Annual Conference, University of Exeter 
Vol No. . 
Luyten, H. (2003) 'The size of school effects compared to teacher effects: an overview of the 
research literature'. School Effectiveness and School Improvement Vol 14, No. 1 
31-52. 
Mackinnon, D., and Statham, J. (1999) ‘Education in the UK: Facts and Figures’, 3
rd 
edition, Open University, Hodder and Stoughton, London. 
McVicar D., 2001, School quality and staying on: Resources, peer groups and ethos, 
Economic and Social Review, 32, 131-151 
Mortimore, P. (1991) The nature and findings of school effectiveness research in the primary 
sector. In Riddell, S. and Brown, S. (Eds) School Effectiveness  Research: Its 
Messages for School Improvement.  London: HMSO. 
Mortimore, P., Sammons, P., Stoll, L., Lewis, D. and Ecob, R. (1988) School Matters: the 
Junior Years. Wells, Somerset,: Open Books. 
Muijs, D. and Reynolds, D. (2000) 'School effectiveness and teacher effectiveness in 
mathematics: some preliminary findings from an evaluation of the mathematics 
enhancement programme'. School Effectiveness  and School Improvement Vol 11, 
No. 3 273-304. 
Muijs, D. and Reynolds, D. (2001) Effective Teaching: Evidence and Practice. London: 
Paul Chapman. 
Naylor R., J. Smith and A. McKnight (2002) ‘Why is there a graduate earnings premium for 
students from independent schools?’, Bulletin of Economic Research, 54, 315-339 
Nickell S., 1993, Cohort size and the wages of young men in Britain 1961-89, British 
Journal of Industrial Relations, 31, 456-69 
Ono H., 2002, On the adjusted rate of return to women’s university education: A preliminary 
study of OECD countries, Stockholm School of Economics, mimeo  
Rosenthal L. 2003, The value of secondary school quality, Oxford Bulletin of Economics 
and Statistics,  
Rutter, M., Maughan, B., Mortimore, P. and Ouston, J. (1979) Fifteen Thousand Hours: 
secondary schools and their effects on children. Shepton Mallet, UK: Open Books. 
Sammons, P. (1999) School Effectiveness: coming of age in the twenty first century. Lisse, 
Neths: Swets and Zeitlinger. 
Sammons, P., Hillman, J. and Mortimore, P. (1995) Key characteristics of effective schools: 
a review of school effectiveness research, London University Institute of Education 
  35Schagen, S., Davies, D., Rudd, P. and Schagen, I. (2002) The Impact of specialist and faith 
schools on performance. Slough: NFER. 
Smith, D. J. and Tomlinson, S. (1989) The School Effect: a study of multiracial 
comprehensives. London: Policy Studies Institute. 
Teddlie, C. and Reynolds, D. (Eds), (1999) In The International Handbook of School 
Effectiveness Research.  London: Routledge, Falmer. 
Todd P. and K. Wolpin (2003), On the specification and estimation of the production function 
for cognitive achievement, The Economic Journal, 113, F3-F33 
Vignoles, A., Levacic, R., Walker, J., Machin, S. and Reynolds, D. (2000) ‘The relationship 
between resource allocation and pupil attainment: a review’, London, DfEE. 
Wayne, A. J. and Young, P. (2003) 'Teacher characteristics and student achievement gains: a 
review'. Review of Educational Research Vol 73, No. 1 89-122Tooley, J. (2000) 
‘Reclaiming Education’, London, Cassell. 
Woodhead, C. (2002) ‘Class War: The State of the British Education’, Little, Brown, 
London. 
 
  36